United States around the Cape of Good Hope would add $3.5 million per year in additional fuel costs while cutting its delivery capacity by 26%.
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iii. Insurance
In 2008 alone, the cost of additional war-risk insurance for a ship's passage through the Gulf of Aden rose from $500 to $20,000 per trip. Applied to the 21,000 ships transiting the Gulf annually, the total annual cost to insure these ships could be as high as $400 million. 12 To the extent this represents a new revenue source for insurers and is greater than their overall payouts, insurers may prefer the status quo to stronger anti-piracy measures. One would therefore expect demands for stronger protection to come from the shippers themselves, as has mostly been the case.
iv. Indirect Economic Costs
Piracy imposes other indirect economic costs. For example, whenever a ship avoids the Gulf of Aden by re-routing around the Cape of Good Hope, Egypt loses out on revenue from the Suez Canal, the second-most central port in the global shipping network.
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v. Unarmed Defensive Measures
In 2009, the IMO promulgated a set of "best management practices" for avoiding and repelling pirate attacks. 14 The recommendations include coordinating transits with military vessels in the area, pressurizing fire hoses with which to hit attacking pirates, and posting more lookouts. 15 Other defensive measures include "greasing or electrifying of hand rails and the installation of barbed wire in vulnerable parts of ships." 16 More sophisticated equipment has also been employed with mixed success. One non-lethal device, the long-rage acoustical device ("LRAD")-which sells for over $20,000-emits directionally-focused and painfully-loud sound as one way to deter approach by potential attackers. 17 However, after a few initial successes against pirates, the LRAD has since proven ineffective. 18 After using an LRAD to no effect, one British security guard said, "We thought it would make the pirates back off, but they just laughed. It was a total waste of time." 19 Another as-yet unproven non-lethal measure on the market is a set of polypropylene rope nets called Propeller Arresters, which are even more expensive than the LRAD. The company marketing the system claims that a set of Propeller
Arrestors, laid out around a ship's perimeter, will tangle the propellers of approaching boats to stop and deter pirate attacks. 20 In sum, although there are several documented instances of nonlethal defenses stopping pirate attacks, Somali pirates have proven to be determined adversaries capable of overcoming any such defenses employed thus far. 15 Id. at 6-10. 16 include any of the costs of the military personnel and equipment used, which are borne individually by the contributing states. Taking those costs into account, one analyst estimates the total cost of the European operation at upwards of $300 million for one year. 24 Although difficult to quantify accurately, the aggregate economic costs of Somali piracy likely run into the billions of dollars, 25 with some estimates as high as $16 billion per year. 26 In historical context, however, this cost is slight. At the beginning of the 19 th century, the United
States paid out a substantial portion of its treasury in tribute to the Barbary powers. 27 As a very rough point of comparison, the EU NAVFOR operation consumes merely 0.002% of the EU's budget, or 0.00002% of the EU's combined $14.5 trillion gross product.
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II. Deterring Piracy: Risk and Reward
The scale and sophistication of Somali pirate operations-often involving extended voyages, multiple fast boats deployed from larger "motherships," and an organized investment market 29 -show that today's pirates are sophisticated and rational economic actors. They are not, as some press reports portray them, merely khat-chewing petty criminals acting on impulse. 30 As with any other economic activity, these business associations have emerged because the participants perceive piracy's rewards to outweigh its risks. 
C. Incapacitation
As discussed above, the pattern of "catch-and-release" seriously impairs naval forces' ability to incapacitate pirates by putting them on trial and into prison. The less savory alternative, of course, is to kill them instead. Before the birth of modern human-rights law, this had been the standard way of dealing with pirates in much of the world, and many now advocate its return. could well be more effective, and cheaper, than the current approach, which is almost entirely defensive and reactive.
D. Incentives Toward Offense
Fundamentally, deterring maritime piracy boils down to altering pirates' risk-reward assessments. Unfortunately, pirates' hostages serve dual purposes: they are both bargaining chips for ransom negotiations and human shields used to dissuade attempts to recover ships by force. Although the shipping industry has public and private mechanisms for reporting pirate attacks, even this most basic tool is greatly underutilized because of perceived fear of insurers raising their premiums, pirates retaliating, and other reasons. Perhaps less surprisingly, the insurance industry turned the surge in piracy into a profit center by selling new forms of "kidnap and ransom" insurance.
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Even insurers, however, appear to be reaching the conclusion that the status quo cannot last forever. One major maritime shipping insurer with historical ties to the Opium Wars 48 has
proposed funding a private navy to patrol the Somali coast, signaling its belief that both the international naval efforts, as well as efforts to build up the TFG's capacity, are insufficient to protect its interests. 
III. The Return of Private Military Force
Several conflicts in the last two decades demonstrate that offensive operations by private military companies can be surprisingly effective and inexpensive compared to other approaches.
For example, in 1993, the government of Angola signed a $40 million contract with Executive Outcomes. 52 In one year, the firm reconstituted and trained a 5,000-strong Angolan army brigade, brought in former Soviet aircrews to maintain and fly aircraft the country lacked the expertise to operate itself, and fielded its own special-operations forces. 53 The firm then commanded these joint public-private forces in an offensive that quickly brought the UNITA rebels, which the Angolan government had been fighting for two decades, to the negotiating 
IV. Law and Private Transnational Violence
Both domestic and international law may apply to incidents of transnational violence between non-state actors. 61 As will be demonstrated, public international law, which has focused primarily on states, is not well-equipped to deal with this form of violence, which does not fit the 57 See Part IV.C, infra, and id. 
C. International Law's Weak Prohibition of Mercenarism
A report to the U.K. House of Commons (the Green Paper) explains why "mercenary" is such a loaded term: "In modern times mercenaries have a bad reputation, so much so that the word has become almost a form of abuse. This is based partly on the experience of the 60s and 70s when, starting with the Congo, mercenaries were associated with instability and secessionist movements. They were also involved both in a number of attempted coups and in human rights shortcomings are many and well documented. 79 The common key flaw of these instruments is that they focus too narrowly on specific instances of abuse, and fail to take a broader historical view of private military activity.
As discussed below, 80 The Mercenary Convention is also largely hamstrung by its lack of meaningful adoption-only 79 Id. at 9, ¶ 16 (concluding that "The internationally agreed definitions have been shaped to suit the agendas of those drafting them and are not necessarily very useful"). 80 See infra Part IV.G. 81 Percy's articulation of a strong norm against using mercenaries supports the view that using private force against pirates is objectionable, even if that norm is reflected poorly in the official instruments of international law.
D. Somali Law
One principal reason for the growth of Somali piracy is, of course, the lack significant law-enforcement capacity since the central government's collapse in 1991. 
G. International Humanitarian Law
International humanitarian law ("IHL"), or the law of armed conflict ("LOAC"), is a rich body of law best known for the Geneva Conventions, but which traces its roots to the Lieber The remaining question, then, is whether pirates qualify as "[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities" at all. There are two parts to this question: first, whether there are "hostilities"; and second, whether the pirates are "taking no active part" in them. "Hostilities"
and "armed conflict," although terms of art in IHL, lack universally accepted definitions.
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Determining whether any incident of armed violence rises to the level of "armed conflict" is both fact intensive and often subjective, especially for determinations of non-international armed conflict.
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The hypothetical scenario presented in this paper, a PMC attacking Somali pirates, is most likely not an "armed conflict" because (1) both sides' goals are primarily economic, not political; (2) although the PMC has military objectives against pirates, the same is not true of the pirates; and (3) there is no overall umbrella group or political movement behind the pirates; and (4) piracy is defined clearly by international law as a crime, not as an act of war. These factors were quite different in the U.S.' early conflict with the Barbary pirates, in which piracy was used as an instrument of state by three Barbary powers, Tripoli, Algiers and Tunis, which, "although 114 Common Article 3, supra note 113. "with professed pirates there is no state of peace, they are the enemies of every country, and at all times, and therefore are universally subject to the extreme rights of war"-in other words, summary execution of pirates was the norm.
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But should there be a piracy exception to the strong rules and norm against extrajudicial killing? Given the strength and clarity of the prohibition against extrajudicial killing-which is unequivocally non-derogable for anything beyond self-defense-the obvious answer is no.
On the other hand, many facts underlying piracy work against this absolute position.
Because they sail from predictable locations with unusual equipment (e.g., weapons and shipboarding gear such as ladders), with reasonable efforts, pirates could be identified with precision while they are at sea even before they engage in acts of piracy. Given the absence of innocent civilians or property at sea, collateral damage there is especially unlikely, assuming the attacks 131 -a categorization akin to a perpetrator of modern crimes against humanity. Finally, the culpability of men in a swarm of fast boats approaching merchant vessels with assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and ladders is not seriously in question.
Absent evidentiary problems, it is difficult to foresee a scenario under which fair judicial proceedings would result in a not-guilty verdict for someone aboard such a boat. 132 When so many of the circumstances militating for full human-rights enforcement are lacking, the arguments for full enforcement of suspected pirates' human rights lose much of their force. However, given the extraordinarily strong language setting out the fundamental human right to life in the UDHR, ICCPR, and other legal instruments, a return to summary execution of pirates at sea seems out of the question.
B. How Much Process are Pirates Due?
One principal objection to extrajudicial killings is that they constitute a deprivation of life and liberty without sufficient process. But how much process is sufficient, and do pirates require Rumsfeld. 134 Justice Stevens looked to customary international law to establish a floor for due process to be afforded to prisoners of war, namely that the accused be present when any evidence is given against him. 135 However, because Justice Kennedy declined to reach the merits of whether the military commission at issue satisfied Common Article 3, 136 the Court did not reach a majority opinion on that question. In dissent, Justice Thomas rejected Justice Stevens' position on Common Article 3, arguing that the commission need not function like a court-martial, a premise on which the majority proceeded, and that Common Article 3's "nebulous standards"
were "easily" satisfied.
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C. The Law of Armed Conflict's Prohibition on Targeted Killings
The prohibition on targeted killings in the law of armed conflict is generally credited to Francis Lieber and the Code he developed for the Union Army at Lincoln's request during the U.S. Civil War. 138 Article 148 of the Lieber Code, which prohibits assassination, reads:
The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile government, an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any captor, any more than the modern law of peace allows such intentional outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage. The sternest retaliation should follow the murder committed in consequence of such proclamation, made by whatever authority.
Civilized nations look with horror upon offers of rewards for the assassination of enemies as relapses into barbarism.
139
Underlying Lieber's prohibition on assassination (or targeted killings in contemporary parlance) is the proposition that combatants in armed conflict, unless guilty of atrocities, should not be treated as criminals either during or after hostilities. Instead, they should be treated with a "presumption of innocence," meaning that "no soldier faces arrest, trial, and punishment for killing enemy soldiers." This proposition, like the Geneva Conventions' prohibition against giving no quarter, is premised on a desire to avoid a cycle of escalating atrocities.
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Although pirates are unlikely to agree to a reciprocal formal code of conduct, neither
Lieber nor Lincoln expected the Confederacy to adopt the Lieber Code. Still, the Code had an important signaling function analogous to modern human-rights and humanitarian law norms.
One reason that pirate attacks and hostage-holding are so infrequently lethal is the pirates' strong incentive to remain within the bounds of these norms so as to avoid being put outside those would "warrant" prosecution is not specified, and the text implies that a state's satisfaction to that end may be entirely subjective. Although the track record for prosecution of Somali pirates is far from stellar, 145 in the case of a PMC attack itself constituting piracy or a SUA offense, such a subjective standard could even more easily result in impunity.
The UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 146 (hereinafter "TOC Convention") creates powerful tools for prosecuting transnational crime. Substantively, instead of enumerating specific offenses, the TOC Convention operates on any crime with a domestic sentence of four years or more, creates conspiracy offenses, and outlaws participation in organized-crime groups. 147 Procedurally, the TOC Convention facilitates cooperation between authorities of different states, including extradition. 148 For example, because piracy is recognized as one of the core international crimes and carries heavy punishment worldwide, Somali pirates would clearly qualify as "organized criminal groups" committing "serious crime," and therefore would be subject to the TOC Convention. 149 Perhaps less intuitively, however, a PMC chartered to fight piracy could just as easily find itself ensnared by the TOC Convention. So long as it intended to kill, any modern firm would satisfy the TOC Convention's definition of an "organized criminal group." 150 If the PMC is hired to kill pirates, its employees could be charged with murder-which, in all likelihood, carries a maximum sentence greater than four years in every state party to the TOC Convention. Thus, the many complexities of humanitarian law, human rights, and mercenaries are potentially moot; a domestic prosecutor in any involved state could invoke the TOC Convention's procedural advantages and proceed along the familiar lines of a murder case.
Conclusions
The world is afflicted with many grave threats and problems, but today, maritime piracy is not among them. Over the last several years, the international community has spent hundreds of millions of dollars waging a losing battle against small bands of Somali pirates who have inflicted substantial economic damage but actually killed only a handful of sailors. Because they do not work, states should abandon their current counter-piracy policies and instead direct their attention and resources to areas with better prospects for lasting impact-economic and political development on land in Somalia, for example.
Clearly, however, something must be done about the explosion of Somali piracy. Because modern piracy is largely an economic crime, and because states have proven ill-suited to stop it with any of the political, legal, or military tools thus far deployed, economic actors (i.e., the shipping companies) should be given greater leeway to respond effectively. In the Somali piracy context, this means using force-at the very least to defend against attacks in progress However, because pirates are unlikely to respond to anything short of major violence, the next choice is stark: either stop at defensive force-which has so far provided little deterrenceor grant PMCs authority to strike pirate enterprises preemptively. This boils down to an easily stated, but troubling question: should the international community accept to the economic cost of piracy (which continues to rise), or should it accept the humanitarian costs of authorizing private military force against it? If states choose the latter option, they would be essentially reverting to the maritime law of centuries past. To do so today, however, they must create an explicit exemption to the substantial body of human-rights and humanitarian law that has developed
